So, one might now ask, what exactly is 'Wittgensteinian' thought? In the preface, Wittgenstein describes his failure to synthesize his points into a unified work. When we say that we see something, we are expressing a belief that a specific perception is apparent to us, wherein no alternative perceptions are relevant. Thus, it is unacceptable to a positivist to allow that 'seeing' can be conceptualized as simply something which we do, as something which can stand on its own two feet, without need of verification by a further supporting account. The fact that there are illusions of the senses, contrary to what Russell claims, somehow revolts against the idea that every object of sense contains root data that the brain merely interprets in different ways. To interpret it as a wire frame, we imagine that the sides of the figure are not solid, and that the lines are made out of thin metal wire. The duck and the rabbit both seem to impress themselves upon us in some eery, inexplicable manner. The purpose of this essay is to attempt to elucidate, assess, and defend Wittgenstein's contentions that there are certain damning conceptual confusions in the traditional philosophical account of what it is to 'see' or to have any other sensory experience for that matter. For now, however, we are concerned with one simple question. Logical positivists, for example, maintain that the meaning of a proposition is its mode of verification. Sharing the same physical location in space does not make it so that the word to denote the objects can be used to mean both concepts at once. From this passage, it is apparent that Russell, in light of this rather simple example, maintains that there must be some constituting or essential object being perceived, and whether it is perceived to be one thing or another is determined solely by the brain's interpretation, be it mistaken or not, of what that object is. Russell, Bertrand. Modern philosophers of the traditional vein, in their attempts to align the study of philosophy with the methodological commitments of science, have come under this aforementioned presupposition that the brain is really the "I" and the eyes do the seeing for it. Science can tell us how the eyes and nerves work, what kind of chemicals are released in the brain, how much electrical activity is occurring in what part of the brain under what stimuli, and so on. In our language game, we use intentional or action concepts to describe what we do. Certain patterns of movement are physiologically impossible; hence, for example, I cannot see the schematic cube as two interpenetrating prisms. 2. We mentally embellish the object in a way which conforms to what we believe the object is or may be meant to represent. Philosophical Investigations is divided into two parts, consisting of what Wittgenstein calls, in the preface, Bemerkungen, translated by Anscombe as "remarks". Wittgenstein's claims, it should be noted, have the same implications for our other senses as well. If, by the word "habit," Russell means that we have come to make these inferences so often and so routinely that such a practice has now become seemingly automatic to us, would he not be implying that at one time in our lives, before we developed such habits, our perceptions actually did not occur to us spontaneously as they do now? Personally, I do not recall ever having had to develop the habit of 'seeing' things properly; of going through a process of hypothesizing about whether I see a cat or something else. Wittgenstein discussed the case of the duck-rabbit figure, which we can see as a duck, or see as a rabbit, but not both at the same time.) (The draft of water, the draft of a treaty.) It does in fact seem wrong to say that the picture-duck and the picture-rabbit look the same, because they are two completely different pictures. 2e. What are we interpreting? But few have also recognised how Wittgenstein may in fact challenge enactivist approaches. For to do so might give it that ghostly, metaphysical aspect which positivists are so intent on eradicating. What could Wittgenstein mean by this assertion? However, as already mentioned in the context of 'permanent aspect seeing', this does not mean that every seeing is to be understood as a seeing as, which Wittgenstein points out in various passages. What seems disturbing about this account to me, and I'm inclined to think Wittgenstein would agree, is that there are an awful lot of "inferences" or "hypotheses" being made for a process which is described as an entirely "spontaneous" one. (my italics) (2). Since Wittgenstein's ideas seem to elude classification so thoroughly, it is difficult to refer to them as anything but 'Wittgensteinian'. It is like describing how messages from the brain tell one foot to place itself in front of the other in such and such a fashion, in what manner the knees, ankles, and toes bend, etc., etc., and claiming that such an account of the mechanics of human bipedal locomotion is what it is to walk. Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is a stimulating presentation of a wide-ranging and sophisticated perspective, rigorous and yet generous with argumentative opponents, and making a significant contribution to the literature on the Wittgenstein's later thought as a whole. 212e, 10. Up to a point, we can test this hypothesis by experiment: we can touch the cat, and pick it up by the tail to see if it mews. By“very big”, I believe he means both that the aestheticdimension weaves itself through all of philosophy in the mannersuggested above, and that the reach of the aesthetic in humanaffairs is very much greater than the far more restricted reach of theartistic; the world is densely packed with manifestations ofthe aesthetic sense or aesthetic interest, while the number of works ofart i… With Karl Johnson, Michael Gough, Tilda Swinton, John Quentin. Based upon past experience with similar bundles and through force of habit, we infer or interpret that the resulting perception is in fact that of a cat (he even refers to 'seeing' the cat as a hypothesis, and further suggests a method by which to test it!). As Wittgenstein writes in the above sections, he takes 'interpretation' to be an action in which we make a conjecture or an inference, which may end up being false. All rights reserved. By Volker A. Munz. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. When we see the figure one way instead of the other, we are not actively producing an interpretation of it, but rather our seeing it one way or another is an expression of our visual experience. In regard to such confusions concerning psychological concepts in particular,in can be said that Wittgenstein quite literally has volumes to say on the subject. Ideas such as these can properly be called interpretations. Even the person Wittgenstein calls 'aspect-blind' would be capable of seeing the similarity between two faces thus understood (see Wittgenstein 2009, Part II, 257), . Wittgenstein's aim is to steer us off of this crooked path of theorizing based on such a priori presuppositions. ('Inference' and 'interpretation' are interchangeable terms as far as such issues are concerned.) 8. This is the trap into which traditional philosophy has fallen: to maintain that the eyes 'see' and the ears 'hear', and that we, as brains, consciously as well as unconsciously interpret the information that we receive from the sensory apparati that are positioned throughout the bodies in which we reside. To say that we 'see' something can stand on its own two feet, without the need for verification by any further supporting account. When we normally speak of seeing in our everyday language-game, we are not inclined to say, "I see the picture as a duck," but rather we simply say, "I see a duck.". 110. 4. He seems to be showing us, contrary to those who mistakenly take him to be a behaviorist, that there are internal, inexplicable things going on within us, that the things we do and experience cannot all be explained or accounted for by pointing to some physical origin or process. These essays show that aspect-seeing was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein's later writings, but, rather, that it was a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy's attention to the actual conditions of our common life in … This is the way that we have come to use and understand the concept in our language game. One such presupposition is that the brain in itself is the seat of consciousness, and the rest of the body is a sort of mechanistic, organic vehicle in which the brain resides and by which it maneuvers through the world. The case of seeing aspects seems that, at least for particular kinds of drawings, the aspects must somehow already be contained in the picture. 1952. pp. 167, 5. In §515-517 of Volume II of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Wittgenstein puts it this way: 515. This is the introduction to Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, eds. And if they were to be deemed meaningless, then how could any form of empirical verification be meaningful when empirical verification in itself is in fact wholly dependent upon statements which declare sensory observations (i.e., "I see where the optic nerve attaches to the brain")? (10). However, there is something about the nature of this picture which tells against the traditional, theoretical account of what it is to 'see', namely that it appears to have the effect of an illusion. For instance, the statement, "God exists," simply has no meaning since it cannot be empirically verified to be true or false. 516. We would never then say, or it would at least seem very peculiar of us to say, "I see it as a duck," just as it would seem utterly strange to hear someone who is looking up toward the sky at a distant airplane say, "I see it as an airplane!" Difficulties with Wollheim's borrowing from Wittgenstein --pt. Denonn, Lester E. Ed. All references will be to this volume. What does it mean to see? It might seem logical or common-sensical to someone like Russell that the duck-rabbit figure is one and the same picture, and that we simply interpret it differently, but as it appears, we simply cannot escape the experience of seeing two entirely unique pictures. Therefore, when modern psychology or neuroscience provides us with an empirical account of 'seeing', and tells us that the brain somehow 'organizes' visual data into recognizable perceptions, we tend to associate 'organizing' with 'interpreting', and say that it simply happens spontaneously and without conscious thought. Vol. Goldfarb quotes Wittgenstein from the Philosophical Investigations, §131. Wittgenstein on Seeing Aspects 3 another, in the sense which Richard Wollheim has given to his notion,4 the change involves moving from seeing one thing in the figure to seeing a different, and incompatible, thing in it-from seeing a duck in the figure to seeing a rabbit in it. Is this not the way that we have come to use and understand the concept of interpretation in our everyday language game, namely that an interpretation is at least to some degree a conscious and deliberate inference which may or may not turn out to be correct? . . For example, to interpret the figure as a brick, we might imagine it with an earthen color and a rough texture. The point is that we consciously and deliberately drum up ideas concerning what this figure may be meant to represent. (7). An interpretation or inference is a conscious action which is performed over and above what happens when we 'see' something. It is known that he even repudiated the schools of thought which he himself had influenced, such as logical positivism and the "Oxford School" of linguistic philosophy. Volume I. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Modern science, particularly psychology, tries to shed light on the question of how we can be said to see, hear, taste, smell, and feel in terms of theories which explain how sensations become perceptions. "Wittgenstein on Understanding". Usually the experiment succeeds; when it does not, its failure is easily accounted for without modifying the laws of physics. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is the first collection to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on the concept of aspect-seeing. Wittgenstein then goes on to ask: "what does seeing the figure now this way and now that consist in?" ', I could answer him only that way. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. The data that the senses acquire and deliver to the brain via electrical impulses along the body's nervous system, as current psychological theories dictate, is manifested in the brain in the form of unorganized percepts (which can be considered another form of data). If we were to play a specific note, for instance, say E flat, on the guitar for such a person, he will immediately recognize it as E flat, in just the same way that we can immediately recognize the color blue when it is presented to us. To view the two pictures at the same time, to use an example of Wittgenstein's regarding 'meaning' (8), would be like trying to use the word "bank" in a manner that meant both of its meanings at the same time (financial bank, river bank). Wittgenstein is particularly troubled by this sort of theoretical reduction of what we can be said to be doing when we say we see something. A scientistic viewpoint ignores this need for clarification. As I understand Russell, to 'see' a cat, in a nutshell, is to infer that our eyes are being affected by a bundle of certain frequencies of light. This collection examines the idea of 'seeing-in' as it appears primarily in the work of Wollheim but also its origins in the work of Wittgenstein. (9). Wittgenstein wants to begin by attempting to clarify what can properly be called a case of interpreting. 176. Before you dismiss, please consider making a donation. Therefore the brain is thought of as making interpretations on both the conscious and the unconscious level. In more specific terms, we become passive observers to the different aspects that the object seems to take on as we view it.